Fifth Circuit Reopens Challenge to Federal Felon Gun Ban After Justice Thomas Questions § 922(g)

A federal appeals court has reopened a constitutional challenge that could become important far beyond one Louisiana firearm case. In United States v. Squire, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit voted to rehear the case en banc—meaning the full active court will reconsider a challenge to the federal felon-in-possession law, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

The development matters because Justice Clarence Thomas recently questioned the assumption that Supreme Court precedent has already settled the constitutional validity of § 922(g) under the Commerce Clause. His concurrence in United States v. Hemani did not invalidate the statute, and it was not the opinion of the Court on that issue. But the Fifth Circuit’s own July 2026 rehearing order expressly recognized that Thomas’s concurrence had reopened the debate.

What happened in United States v. Squire?

Curtis Squire was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the federal law that generally prohibits firearm possession by a person convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year in prison, subject to statutory exceptions. Police found a handgun in his New Orleans home. His prior record included drug-trafficking convictions and burglary.

In June 2026, a three-judge Fifth Circuit panel rejected Squire’s Second Amendment challenge. The panel concluded that the historical tradition of firearm regulation permitted disarming a convicted drug trafficker based on dangerousness. Importantly, however, the panel described its ruling as narrow: it did not decide whether Congress may permanently disarm every person with every kind of felony conviction.

Then the case changed direction. The Fifth Circuit granted rehearing en banc on July 20, 2026 and vacated the June panel opinion. The court’s current schedule places the en banc rehearing in January 2027.

The new issue is bigger than the Second Amendment

Squire’s renewed challenge focuses heavily on the Commerce Clause. Congress has only the powers granted to it by the Constitution. Section 922(g) contains an interstate-commerce element: prosecutors generally establish it by showing that the firearm or ammunition previously traveled across state lines.

For decades, federal courts have treated that historical movement in interstate commerce as enough to support federal jurisdiction over later possession. In practical terms, if a handgun was manufactured in one state and later possessed in another, the government has typically been able to satisfy the statute’s commerce element even if the defendant’s possession itself was entirely local.

Squire is asking the Fifth Circuit to reconsider whether that minimal connection is constitutionally sufficient. His argument is not simply that his Second Amendment rights were violated. It is that Congress may have exceeded its enumerated Commerce Clause power by criminalizing possession that is local and noncommercial.

What Justice Thomas said in Hemani

In United States v. Hemani, decided June 18, 2026, Justice Thomas wrote separately to address the Commerce Clause foundation of § 922(g). He explained that the Supreme Court’s 1977 decision in Scarborough v. United States interpreted the statute’s interstate-commerce language, but did not decide the separate constitutional question of how far Congress’s Commerce Clause power extends.

Thomas pointed to the tension between that minimal statutory nexus and later Commerce Clause cases such as United States v. Lopez. His concurrence stated that lower courts should not treat Scarborough as if it conclusively resolved the constitutional question.

That position was Thomas’s own concurrence—not a majority holding. But when the Fifth Circuit granted rehearing in Squire, Judge Stephen Higginson’s dissent characterized the court as answering Thomas’s call to reexamine § 922(g)’s Commerce Clause basis.

Why the Fifth Circuit’s rehearing matters

An en banc rehearing is significant because the earlier three-judge decision is no longer the controlling panel opinion. The full Fifth Circuit can now reconsider the legal theory from the ground up. The Fifth Circuit covers Texas, Louisiana and Mississippi, so any eventual ruling will directly matter in those states unless later changed by the Supreme Court.

The court’s decision could take several forms. It could uphold § 922(g)(1) under existing Commerce Clause doctrine. It could reject Squire’s challenge on narrower grounds. Or it could conclude that using a firearm’s past interstate travel to federalize later local possession stretches congressional commerce power too far.

The last possibility would be a major development, but it should not be treated as the inevitable outcome. Federal appellate courts have upheld § 922(g)’s commerce element for decades, and Judge Higginson’s dissent emphasized that the statute contains an express interstate-commerce hook that the federal school-zone law struck down in Lopez did not.

Could Squire expand gun rights for people with felony convictions?

Potentially, but the path is uncertain. A broad Commerce Clause ruling could affect the federal government’s authority to prosecute some § 922(g) possession cases. That could matter to people whose firearm possession is entirely intrastate even though the gun previously moved through interstate commerce.

But Squire has not restored anyone’s firearm rights. It has not invalidated § 922(g)(1), and it has not created permission for a prohibited person to possess, receive or purchase a firearm.

It is also important that Squire is not the easiest factual vehicle for expanding rights of nonviolent felons. His predicate record includes serious drug-trafficking conduct and burglary. People with older nonviolent financial, tax, regulatory or other convictions may present different Second Amendment questions. See our offense-specific gun-rights guides for how different felony categories can affect restoration analysis.

What about nonviolent felons?

The more immediate importance of Squire may be doctrinal. If the full Fifth Circuit says courts must take a harder look at Congress’s Commerce Clause authority, that reasoning could extend beyond Squire’s personal criminal history. The issue would become the constitutional source of federal power itself rather than whether a particular person is dangerous enough to be disarmed.

At the same time, courts are separately considering as-applied Second Amendment challenges brought by people with nonviolent or older convictions. Those cases focus on a different question: whether history and tradition justify disarming a particular person or category of people. The Commerce Clause route and the Second Amendment route can overlap in the same case, but they are legally distinct.

Does this change the DOJ restoration process?

No. For now, people who remain federally prohibited should continue to treat the prohibition as fully enforceable. DOJ’s renewed federal firearm-rights restoration program under 18 U.S.C. § 925(c) remains a separate route for individualized relief.

If you are trying to determine whether your own conviction may qualify for relief, start with the Felon Justice Eligibility Review, review your state restoration rules, and, where appropriate, use the Full Restoration Application intake to organize the federal case.

What happens next?

The Fifth Circuit currently lists United States v. Squire, No. 25-30324, for en banc rehearing during its January 2027 session. Supplemental briefing and oral argument will give the full court an opportunity to address both the existing Commerce Clause precedent and Justice Thomas’s recent criticism of how courts have used Scarborough.

Whatever the Fifth Circuit ultimately decides, Supreme Court review is possible but not guaranteed. Until there is a final ruling, § 922(g)(1) remains federal law.

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